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REVIEWABILITY OF QUASI-LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK UNDER
ARTICLE 78 OF THE CPLR
ELEANOR

M. Fox t

INTRODUCTION

T BE

public official is enjoined to act reasonably. Yet
in his performance of the so-called legislative act, the
law places him substantially beyond judicial review and in
effect licenses his arbitrary and unreasonable conduct.
The Commissioner of Mental Hygiene of the State of
New York selected 500 acres of land in the midst of
residential communities for the construction of a school for
retarded children. In an Article 78 proceeding seeking to
set aside the determination, petitioners alleged that the
institution would endanger the psychological and physical
welfare of the community, would cause traffic hazards and
other inconveniences, and would require increased police
and fire protection; that land equally well suited to the
purposes of the state was available in undeveloped areas,
and that such a suitable alternative was adjacent to a state
mental hospital and was already owned by the state. The
court held that petitioners failed to state a cause of action
because the determination was legislative and not subject
to Article 78 review. 1 Thus, the action of the Commissioner,
t LL.B., New York University School of Law; Member of the New
York Bar.
1
Brent v. Hoch, 13 App. Div. 2d 545, 211 N.Y.S2d 953 (2d Dep't 1961)
(memorandum decision). The appellate division affirmed the result reached
by the court below, but based its decision on different grounds. The supreme
court had held that the determination was reviewable under Article 78 but
Qnly to the extent that the taking was "based upon some corrupt, unworthy or
malicious baseless motive, not in good faith, and not in the interest of the
public." 25 Misc. 2d 1062, 1065, 205 N.Y.S2d 66, 70 (Sup. Ct 1960). The
appellate division held that the selection of land was not subject to any

review under Article 78 because it was legislative.
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however arbitrary, was insulated by this practice of judicial
non-interference.
Shortly thereafter, another state official made a selection
of land which was also challenged. The Superifitendent
of the Department of Public Works of the State of New
York, in connection with a federally subsidized highway
program, selected a route for a projected interstate highway
and proposed the location to federal officials for their approval. The federal officials refused to approve the route
selected but suggested that a second highway locationthe Chestnut Ridge Route-would meet with their approval.
The Superintendent of the Department of Public Works,
on the basis of evidence educed at hearings, from expert
studies, and otherwise, strongly reacted against the Chestnut
Ridge Route. He wrote to the Federal Highway Administrator declaring that the Chestnut Ridge Route "is
glaringly deficient" in its ability to service commercial areas,
and "would surely violate the cultural, aesthetic and conservation features of the immediate area"; that the federal
government's insistence on that alignment "appears narrow,
arbitrary and grossly unwarranted," and that decisions such
as these
prompt Congressional Committees to launch excursions into the
realm of highway location and design and demand broader reviews
of such matters to assure, generally, the protection of the public
interest.

2

One month later the Superintendent submitted for federal
approval the Chestnut Ridge Route. The federal officials
approved the location and signed a contract with the state
for its construction. In an Article 78 proceeding against
the -ew York State Highway Department, petitioners
attacked the selection on the ground that it was inconsistent
with statutory standards protecting certain community
interests from invasion by federally aided interstate high2 Letter From J. Burch McMorran to Rex M. Whitton, November 28,
1962, annexed as an exhibit to the amended petition in Brown v. McMorran,
42 Misc. 2d 211, 247 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1963), appeal docketed, No.
3844, 2d Dep't (1963).
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ways, and that, since it would destroy wild-life sanctuaries
and undermine other interests of the community and of the
state, it was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. The
court held that the challenged acts and determination were
legislative and for that reason could not be reviewed under
Article 78.3
In a third case, the Council of the City of New York
and other city officials selected fully developed residential
lands for an extension of Flushing Meadow Park and,
pursuant to a statute providing for state and city financing,
applied to the state for approval and state aid. Landowners
sued under Article 78 to annul the determinations of the
city, to set aside the approval of intermediate state officials,
and to enjoin the state comptroller from giving final authorization to the plan. The selection, the petitioners alleged,
was arbitrary, capricious and illegal because the lands
were not "predominantly open or natural" as required by
the "Standards for Acquisition" set forth in the controlling
state statute. The court held that the petition stated a
good cause of action against the state officials under
Article 78.1

The extreme reluctance of the courts of the State of
New York to adjudicate problems, other than public use,
relating to selection of lands by public officers is reflected
in the school and the highway cases discussed above. In
3 Brown v. McMorran, supra note 2, at 740. The court, exercising its
newly acquired power under CPLR 103(c), caused the proceeding to be
continued as an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
4 Mastrangelo v. State Council of Parks, 42 Misc. 2d 650, 249 N.Y.S.2d
19 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mern., - App. Div. 2d -, 251 N.Y.S.2d 788 (2d Dep't
1964). However, the court dismissed the proceeding against the city officials.
It reasoned that even if the city presumed to select the non-qualifying land in
connection with the state-aid program, it had the power and right to select
any land for park purposes and to expend its own moneys to develop the
area for park use. It would seem, therefore, that the action against the
city officials was premature, and that no action would lie until the city
committed itself, by contract or otherwise, to acquire the land only in
connection with the state-aid program.
It should be noted that petitioners had alleged fraud. They alleged that
at some time after the application was submitted by the city for state approval, the number of buildings recorded as being located on the land to
be acquired was reduced from 80 to 14. The court below did not treat this
allegation as a fact operative and necessary to its decision. But it is not
clear from the limited opinion of the appellate division whether that court
deemed the allegation of fraud essential.
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the school case, petitioners were effectively held to have no
judicial remedy for the arbitrary act which aggrieved them.
(No remedy was available apart from Article 78, for they
had not alleged fraud or bad faith or violation of statutory
standards.) 5 Again in the highway case, the court declared
that petitioners had no remedy under Article 78, and no
remedy at all for arbitrary action as such. Their remedy,
if any, lay in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
based on their establishing that respondents exceeded their
powers by violating statutory requisites, and it did not
accommodate any showing that the acts of respondents were
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
The Flushing Meadow Park case stands nearly alone
in its application of Article 78 to a selection-of-land situation. Yet the Flushing Meadow Park case reflects a proper
application of the law. Perhaps it will lead the way to a
more conscientious review. Perhaps it will bring understanding of the fact that all acts of public officials in the
selection of land are not necessarily legislative, and that
many are, consistent with precedent, appropriate subjects
for the sufficiently broad and relatively rapid review provided
by Article 78.1
As for those acts which by definition legislative,
and not confined by statutory limits, as in the school case,
precedent declares Article 78 inappropriate. It allows for
review in a plenary action only, and it limits review to
questions of fraud, bad faith, and violation of the letter of
the statute. Thus, precedent confers immunity on the
"merely" capricious act. It considers that the requirements
of due process are satisfied merely by the payment of just
compensation for property appropriated.'
5 See cases cited in notes 47 and 51 infra.
6 Of course, even a holding that Article 78 is appropriate for purposes

of determining whether an administrative official complied with statutory
requisites is not a holding that the acts of such official may be scrutinized
as otherwise arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. There may be some
ground for argument that jurisdiction under Article 78 for the first purpose
would carry with it ancillary jurisdiction to entertain the latter issues. But
this result has not yet been achieved.
7 People v. Adirondack Ry., 160 N.Y. 225, 236-39, 54 N.E. 689, 692-93
(1899), aff'd, 176 U.S. 335 (1900).

1964 ]

REVIEW OF QUASI-LEGISLATIVE ACTS

53

This trend of the law should be corrected by the courts,
for it is shockingly inconsistent with the stronger rule which
requires that public officers act reasonably. But the courts
have not shown willingness to resist the rules of law which
insulate the acts of the administrative officer in the selection
of land. The subject therefore becomes an appropriate one
for legislation.
It is the purpose of this article to analyze the manner
in which the courts of New York deal with the so-called
legislative act of the administrative body or officer, to
explain the evolution of this law, and. to suggest a pragmatic
synthesis. In drawing the distinction between the administrative act, which has traditionally been held subject to
Article 78 review, and the legislative act, which has traditionally been held not subject to Article 78 review, the writer
places particular emphasis on zoning law, with its variances
and exceptions, and on the law relating to the selection of
land for public use.
LEGAL BACKGROUND

Historically, the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition were not available to annul, compel
or review legislative acts of public officers. Article 78
of the New York Civil Practice Act, which abolished the
nominal distinctions between the writs and codified the law
pertaining to them, 8 continued this limitation. It identified
as reviewable thereunder only those acts or refusals to act
in the exercise of "judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative or
corporate functions." I The legislative act falls within none
of these categories.
N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCiL., THIRD ANN. REP. 181 (1937).
9 CPA 1284(2). Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act was, by its terms,
available to determine whether a public officer failed to perform a duty
specifically enjoined upon him by law, and whether a public officer, in making
a determination, violated any rule of law affecting the rights of the parties.
The review of a determination expressly related to
CPA 1296(1), (5).
"the relief heretofore available in a certiorari or a mandamus proceeding
8

for the review of any act or refusal to act of a body or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative or corporate functions, which involves
an exercise of judgment or discretion." CPA 1284(2). Performance of a

duty specifically enjoined by law encompassed "all other relief heretofore
available in a mandamus proceeding."

CPA 1284(3).
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Article 78 of the INew York Civil Practice Law and
Rules substantially codifies the corresponding provisions of
the now superseded Civil Practice Act.'0 It thus perpetuates
the principle of law which excludes legislative acts from
review by proceedings in the nature of the prerogative
writs.
The certainty of the law that legislative acts are not
subject to Article 78 is deceptive. The courts have achieved
no uniformity in defining legislative acts. This article considers precisely that problem: What kinds of acts are
legislative, and, as such, are not subject to judicial scrutiny
by a proceeding in the nature of mandamus, certiorari or
prohibition?
The law, as always, achieves clarity at its extremes.
It is settled, for example, that in enacting' or refusing to
enact legislation, legislators are not subject to the prerogative writs." Arbitrary legislation can be annulled in
plenary proceedings, such as actions for injunctive or
declaratory relief, 2 but failure to legislate is immune
from judicial review.'"
10 See 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No.

-,

FINAL REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMIT-

TEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEURE A-662-69; 1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 13,
SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE 394-95. See generally, for a scholarly history of the prerogative
writs in New York, Weintraub, Mandamus and Certiorari in New York
from the Revolution to 189, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 681 (1964); Weintraub,
Statutory Procedures Governing Judicial Review of Administrative Action,
38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 86 (1963).

"I But action by the legislature in excess of its powers can be set aside
under Article 78. Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, - App.
Div. 2d -, 250 N.Y.S.2d 523 (2d Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision). The
court held Article 78 the proper form of proceeding for a declaration of
the invalidity of a local law governing appointment of patrolmen, and for an
injunction cancelling appointments made pursuant to the law and forbidding
further, action under it. The court -said: "Cases holding that [Article 78]
proceedings cannot be invoked to review legislative acts are not here applicable, since petitioners do not question the propriety or the wisdom of the
local law, but the power oi the legislative body to enact it in the face of
allegedly contrary provisions in the State Constitution and statutes." Id. at
-,

250 N.Y.S.2d at 527.

12 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Rodgers v. Village
of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
'3 Cf. Thomas v. Wells, 288 N.Y. 155, 42 N.E.2d 465 (1942); Pelham
Jewish Center v. Board of Trustees, 9 Misc. 2d 564, 170 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup.
Ct. 1957), aff'd men., 6 App. Div. 2d 710, 174 N.Y.S.2d 957 (2d Dep't
1958).
See generally, as to the absolute discretion of the legislature in choosing
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It is also widely recognized that delegation of powers
substantially as broad as those possessed by the legislature
(herein referred to as legislative powers) is unconstitutional
and void.1 4 To satisfy constitutional requisites, the legislature must delegate something less than its plenary powers.
It must formulate the administrative policy the recipient of
the delegation is to carry out. By definition, the officer
administers; he does not legislate.
There are exceptions to the rule that the legislature
must not delegate its plenary powers. First, the legislature
between conflicting policy considerations, Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell,
7 App. Div. 2d 36, 180 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 299,
165 N.E2d 163, 197 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1959).
But failure of the legislature to perform a mandatory administrative
act is subject to review by prerogative writ. Davidson v. Common Council,
40 Misc. 2d 1053, 244 N.Y.S2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
14 Seignious v. Rice, 273 N.Y. 44, 6 N.E2d 91 (1936). The court found
unconstitutional a provision of the New York City Charter delegating the
power to determine whether an applicant for renewal of a plumber's license
must pass an examination. The court said: "The Legislature is free to
choose among conflicting considerations, and mould the law according to
its own will subject only to constitutional restrictions. It cannot delegate
the same freedom of choice to an administrative officer. There it must
erect guide posts which will enable the officer to carry out the will of the
Legislature.
"We may asgume that in the exercise of the powers which the Legislature has sought to confer on the Commissioner of Health he will act reasonably. Nonetheless, if the statute is valid, he may pick and choose among
individuals without formulating a general standard to be used in classification
and without being bound by any standard formulated by the Legislature.
That is not the grant of an incidental power, it is the delegation of a
legislative power. . . . That the Legislature has no power to do." Id. at
50-51, 6 N.E.2d at 93. (Emphasis added.)
See also Green Point Say. Bank v. Zoning Appeals Bd., 281 N.Y. 534,
24 N.E.2d 319 (1939); Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E.2d 281 (1938).
In Small v. Moss, the New York Court of Appeals called attention to the
"distinction between the exercise of the law-making power by a legislative
body ind the exercise of powers delegated to or conferred upon an administrative officer or board by the legislative body. In the first case discretion
may be plenary; in the second case, though the law-making body may confer
a measure of discretion, it must at the same time define the limits of that
discretion and fix the rules or standards which must govern its exercise"
Id. at 295, 18 N.E.2d at 283.
The reason for the distinction was explained as follows: "This court
has repeatedly pointed out that . . . such field of discretion conferred by
law upon an administrative officer . . . must be defined by the Legislature.
The Legislature must set bounds to the field, and must formulate the standards
which shall govern the exercise of discretion within the field. Without the
second rule as a corollary to the first rule there would be no effective restraint upon unfair discrimination or other arbitrary action by the administrative officer." Id. at 298-99, 18 N.E.2d at 285.
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can delegate its legislative powers to a local legislative body.
The local body can then legislate in the same manner and
with the same broad discretion as the delegating body could
have done if it had retained the power.15 Second, a local
legislative body can, by its own legislation, delegate plenary
powers to itself,"6 that is, it can delegate to or reserve
in itself the legislative power to establish policy. Third,
the legislature can delegate its full legislative powers, to a
body either legislative or administrative in character with
respect to the selection and appropriation of land for public
7
highways, parks and similar public uses.1
An understanding of the nature of the delegationwhether legislative, administrative or judicial-is essential
to the analysis of reviewability by proceedings in the nature
of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition. Yet precise
characterization has not been provided by the judiciary3.
RErENTION

OF

POWMiS

AI)MINISTRATIVE

BY A

On

LEGISLATIVE

BODY:

LEGIsLATIW?

A subordinate legislative body, such as a town board,
is customarily empowered to enact zoning ordinances. When
it enacts such local legislation, it retains in some form the
power to alter the zoning scheme. First, the board might
enact a zoning ordinance and reserve, expressly or impliedly,
the power to amend. Second, the board might enact the
ordinance with the provision that, if specified standards are
met, it may issue a special permit allowing variation. Third,
the board might, by its ordinance, reserve to itself the
plenary power to grant a special permit.
In the first instance, the variation, if any, is effected
by the legislative action of the board. In the second
'1

Green Point Say. Bank v. Zoning Appeals Bd., supra note 14; Larkin

Co. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926).
Is Ibid.

17 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); Matter of City of
New York (Ely Avenue), 217 N.Y. 45, 111 N.E. 266 (1916); People v.
Adirondack Ry., 160 N.Y. 225, 54 N.E. 689 (1899), af'd, 176 U.S. 335
(1900).
'I See Schwartz, Administrative Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1429, 1434-35
n. 2 9 (1961).
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instance, the board, in effect, delegates powers to itself as
an administrative body, and its functions with respect to
variations are administrative or quasi-judicial. In the third
case, the function of the board in granting a variation
involves a hybrid of legislative and administrative powers. 19
A. Retention By Legislative Body Of Legislative Powers
When, as in the first instance specified above, the board
enacts an ordinance and reserves the power to amend, the
power of the board to vary the ordinance derives from the
original delegation by the superior legislative body. This
function being purely legislative, the underlying statute need
not prescribe standards and the board can properly act
pursuant to its own plenary powers.
Therefore, the board's action in legislating or in failing
to legislate with respect to a modification of a zoning
ordinance is not reviewable under Article 78. If the board
declines to amend, no review at all is available. If the
board amends, the amendment is subject to attack in a
plenary action as arbitrary, capricious or not reasonably
related to an end within the purview of the police power.2
Non-availability of the prerogative writs to review acts
of legislatures has long obtained. In People ex rel. Trustees
of the Village v. Board of Supervisors,2 the relators attempted to attack by writ of certiorari an act of the board
of supervisors providing for the improvement of certain
public highways at the town's expense. The New York
Court of Appeals held that certiorari did not lie. The act
of the county board, said the court, "was as purely legislative
as if it had been passed by the legislature itself." 22 Indeed
it was, being an ordinance of a local legislative body.
19 See Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc. 2d 894,

898-99, 196 N.Y.S.2d 856, 863-64 (Sup. Ct. 1959).

20 See cases cited notes 12 and 13 supra.
(1892).
Accord, Neddo v. Schrade, 270

21 131 N.Y. 468, 30 N.E. 488

N.Y.
2 2 97, 200 N.E. 657 (1936).

People ex rel. Trustees of the Village v. Board of Supervisors, 131

N.Y. 468, 472, 30 N.E. 488, 489 (1892).
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A quarter of a century later the court of appeals decided
Long I. R.i.
v. Hylan.2 3 The Board of Estimate was
directed by statute to assess, on the opening of a street,
only property within the area to be benefited by the new
thoroughfare. A street was opened but the Long Island
Railroad Company was not benefited. Nevertheless, the
board passed a resolution assessing only the railroad. The
board attempted to justify its action on the theory-later
proved wrong-- that a contract between it and the railroad
required this result. The railroad petitioned for a writ of
certiorari. Holding the form of proceeding improper because
the delegation was to a legislative body, the court of appeals
dismissed.2 4 The Hylan case is of especial interest because
of the nature of the powers delegated and the nature
of the powers exercised. The activity directed to be performed by the board was severely confined to action of an
almost mandatory nature. The activity which the board
presumed to perform was judicial, being an interpretation
of contractual rights. Yet the action of the board was
legislative in manner since any action effected by legislation
is legislative. As the court in Hylan accurately pointed
out, the fact that a legislative body presumes to sit in a
judicial capacity does not make available the writ of
certiorari.
The distinction still obtains. A proceeding for a
judgment 2 5 in the nature of a prerogative writ will not lie
to review 26 or compel27 a legislative change.2" When, in
N.Y. 199, 148 N.E. 189 (1925).
24 The appellate division had declared certiorari appropriate because of
the extraordinary nature of the case and the clear illegality of the act
challenged. 210 App. Div. 761, 206 N.Y. Supp. 239 (1st Dep't 1924).
25Under prior law an Article 78 proceeding terminated with an order.
CPA 1300. Under present law, such a proceeding results in a judgment.
CPLR
7806.
2
GIraci v. Harwood, 6 App. Div. 2d 815, 175 N.Y.S.2d 257 (2d Dep't
1958) (memorandum decision); Weers v. Whiton, 3 App. Div. 2d 924, 162
N.Y.S.2d 680 (2d Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision); Asness Bros. v.
City of New York, 5 Misc. 2d 779, 160 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mere., 4 App. Div. 2d 677, 164 N.Y.S.2d 994 (2d Dep't 1957).
27 Paliotto v. Harwood, 217 N.Y.S2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ; Pelham Jewish
Center v. Board of Trustees, supra note 13; Porpora v. Keating, 13 Misc. 2d
488, 177 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
28 An attack on legislative action, which cannot be maintained under Ar23240
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a zoning ordinance there is no provision authorizing the
local board to grant special exemptions or variances,
the board ha [s] no power to act in the premises except legislatively,
namely, by amending the ordinance, and its failure to so act may
not be made the basis of an article 78 proceeding. The court is
[the] actions [of] . . .
without power to control or direct . .
legislators. 29
B.

Delegation With Standards By Local
Legislative Body To Itself

A delegation by a legislative body, with standards, to
itself, is exemplified by a zoning ordinance enacted by a
town board which allows variation by that board under
specified standards and conditions. If a hearing is required
and if the determination is to be made on the basis of the
information elicited, the board has created for itself the
power to act in a quasi-judicial capacity, and its determination is reviewable as such by a proceeding in the nature of
certiorari.30 However, if the legislative body formulates
a policy, specifies standards and conditions, makes no provision for a hearing, and retains in itself the power to
administer the policy, its acts pursuant to its own legislative
directives are administrative and subject to review by a
proceeding in the nature of mandamus. -'

ticle 78, must be distinguished from a collateral attack on administrative
action made on the theory that the action was performed pursuant to an
invalid law. The latter is an appropriate subject for Article 78 review. In
fact, such a proceeding is generally the only available remedy to challenge
administrative application of an invalid statute. See Berkshire Fine Spinning
Associates, Inc. v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 347, 359, 157 N.E.2d 614,
See also Bergerman v. Gerosa, 208
620, 184 N.Y.S.2d 623, 631 (1959).
Misc. 477, 144 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd snem., 2 App. Div. 2d 659,
152 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd inet., 3 N.Y.2d 855, 145 N.E.2d
22, 166 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1957).
29 Pelham Jewish Center v. Board of Trustees, supra note 13, at 566, 170
N.Y.S.2d at 139.
30 Shields v. Sahm, 14 Misc. 2d 102, 177 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. 1958),
aff'd me., 8 App. Div. 2d 823, 190 N.Y.S.2d 329 (2d Dep't 1959).
31 Copp v. Mead, 194 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mern., 2 App. Div.
2d 873, 154 N.Y.S.2d 848 (2d Dep't 1956).
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Hybrid Action: Reservation Of Power To
Vary Without Formulation Of Standards

The local legislative board might enact legislation and
reserve or delegate to itself, without standards, the power
to alter the effect of that legislation by other than legislative
procedures. How does one characterize the exercise of such
a power? The power need not be regarded as hybrid.
Theoretically, it represents either (1) an unconstitutional
delegation to an administrative body, such delegation being
improper and void for lack of standards, 32 or (2) retention
of legislative powers, properly retained but, on exercise,
not subject to review by proceedings in the nature of
prerogative writs. The latter appears to be the course
which would best satisfy both the Constitution and precedent.
But neither alternative (1) nor (2) is the course chosen
by the judiciary.
In the pre-Article 78 proceeding of Green Point Sav. Bank
v. Zoning Appeals Bd., the court of appeals upheld the
propriety of what amounted to a plenary delegation by the
town board to itself to act in a non-legislative manner in
granting zoning variances. The court said:
Where the approval is thus lodged
and where the matter is one which
persons and property, there need
for the dispensing power, and the

in the local legislative body,
may endanger the safety of
not be formulated standards
ordinance is constitutional.3"

If the ordinance is constitutional, it is because the
local legislative body is acting in a legislative capacity
when it determines whether or not to grant approval for
the building of gasoline service stations and the like. Acting
legislatively, the board can consider what is or is not within
the general welfare and safety. Since the board did act
legislatively, the court, if it confined itself to the historical
principles articulated, should have declared certiorari unavailable. But it did not
32 Cf. Eliret v. Bates, 18 App. Div. 2d 938, 238 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2d Dep't
1963) (memorandum decision).
33Green Point Say. Bank v. Zoning Appeals Bd., 281 N.Y. 534, 538, 24
N.E.2d 319, 321 (1939).
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The outcome of the Green Point case has been endorsed
by recent court of appeals' decisions. In Rothstein V.
County Operating Co., 4 New York's highest court indicated
that
special exemptions, grants or denials, even though by a legislative
body, were for court review purposes administrative with the
result that they are subject to review "as to reasonableness" in an
35
article 78 proceeding.

The result, and the present status of the law, is this:
the hybrid action is a recognized and judicially approved
concept; the delegation to oneself or the retention of
powers, however conceptualized, is valid, and the action of
the public officer pursuant thereto is treated as administrative for purposes of review.
This analysis does change prior law on the availability
of prerogative writs. Previously, the act of the legislative
body was reviewable only in a plenary action, and the
failure to act of the legislative body was not reviewable at
all. At present, however, what is in fact legislative action
(as the alternative to an administrative delegation of
doubtful constitutionality) is reviewable under Article 78.
The rule of the R~othstein case, whatever its inconsistencies with precedent, is a welcome judicial application
of similar treatment to essentially similar functions. The
similarities are inescapable between the acts of a local
legislative body in varying its own ordinance by (1) exercise of its general legislative powers to act in the public
interest and for the general welfare, and (2) exercise of
administrative powers within an expressed scheme and policy
which it, itself, has formulated according to its concept of
346 N.Y.2d 728, 158 N.E.2d 507, 185 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1959).

35As stated in and followed by Lemir Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 11 N.Y.
2d 20, 24, 181 N.E.2d 407, 409, 226 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376 (1962).
Accord,
Adams Holding Corp. v. Spitz, 17 App. Div. 2d 853, 233 N.Y.S.2d 486 (2d
Dep't 1962) (memorandum decision); Steine v. Kirvin, 17 App. Div. 2d
716, 230 N.Y.S.2d 463 (3d Dep't 1962) (memorandum decision); Berg v.
Michaclis, 37 Misc. 2d 1076, 237 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Rochester
Poster Advertising Co. v. Town of Irondequoit, 33 Misc. 2d 1072, 227
N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, supra note 19.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 39

public interest and general welfare. But even more inescapable are the similarities between (1) above and a
variation granted by a town board by means of amendment
to a zoning ordinance. Yet the latter, so purely legislative
both in its method and in the character of the function,
remains unimpeachable under Article 78.0
One might tend to imply from the Rothstein case and
those following it that an act of a public official, although
legislative in character (properly based on broad considerations of public interest and general welfare), is nonetheless
within the purview of the prerogative writs if administrative
rather than legislative in method. Alternatively one might
infer that, where standards are for one reason or another
excused," the delegation to a public officer who is to act
other than by the enactment of legislation is a delegation
of administrative functions and must be treated as such
for purposes of review.
But case law demonstrates that such principles cannot
be educed. In fact, in the area of law to which the writer
now turns, the judicial approach is exactly the converse.
DELEGATION OF LIMITED AND OF UNLIMITED POWnRS TO A
NON-LEGISLATIVE BODY: AN UNEXPLORED AnEA FOR
MANDAMU'S

Frustration of residents and landowners in their
attempts to annul the allegedly illegal selection of lands
for public highways, parks and institutions began early
in the history of American jurisprudence. The frustration
was, however, attributable in a large part to the then
36 Cases decided as recently as 1961 have so held. Cf. notes 26 and 27
supra. The Rothstein and Lemir Realty decisions seem not to alter this rule
of law. The language of the two cases encompasses nothing more than the
grant or denial of special exemptions, which are by definition not legislative
amendments. The inclusion of legislative amendments within the theory of
these cases is not justified. However close in effect the amendment and the
special exemption may be, the purely legislative character of the first is
beyond question.
37 Standards may be excused because of impracticability of formulation,
or because the body to which the powers are delegated is legislative.
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existing technicalities associated with the prerogative writs,
rather than to the essence of the alleged wrong.
A body of cases arose, subsequently cited for the
proposition, but not always holding, that the selection of
land by a public official for given public purposes is purely
legislative and is not within the scope of the prerogative
writs.
In 1892, the court of appeals decided People ex rel.
Trustees of the Village v. Board of Supervisors." As indicated in the discussion above, the relators sought to
challenge an enactment of the county supervisors by writ
of certiorari. The court properly pointed out that the act
was legislative. When action is legislative, executive or
administrative, said the court, certiorari does not lie.8
Twenty years later a county court decided In re
Sherman.'
The relators sought a writ of certiorari to review the location of a highway by the State Commissioner
of Highways. This time the action challenged was clearly
not legislative. The claim was based on a statutory command that the administrative official lay the highway in
question to a given point, "thence westerly." The relator
alleged that the official laid the road from the given point,
then north, then westerly. The court's concern was whether
the determination was judicial, for, if not, certiorari was
inappropriate. The court pointed to the fact that no hearing
was necessary; it recited the law that in judicial proceedings
a hearing is a matter of right, and it declared the determination not a judicial one. Therefore, the petition was
dismissed.
Other pre-Article 78 cases of a similar nature followed.
Sometimes they indicated that the act of the public officer
was administrative and not subject to review by certiorari ;41
at other times, that the act was legislative and not subject
38 Supra note 22.

-9 The court further pointed out that a writ was not needed to prevent a
failure of justice. As the claim was against a municipality, a taxpayer'.
action was available. Ibid.
4076 Misc. 45, 133 N.Y. Supp. 931 (Sup. Ct. 1912) (memorandum
decision).
4
E.g., Mt. Hope Dev. Corp. v. James, 258 N.Y. 510, 180 N.E. 252 (1932)
(per curiam).
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to review by certiorari ;2 but always that the determination
was not judicial and therefore certiorari did not lie.43 When,
on the other hand, a determination entailing ultimate appropriation of land was made in a quasi-judicial context,
review by certiorari was held appropriate."
Of much significance in the cases referred to above is
the fact that, in the early years of the development of the
writ of mandamus, it was available only to compel the
performance of ministerial acts. Whenever judgment or
discretion was involved, mandamus could not be invoked.45
Only later did mandamus become available to challenge
action or failure to act by a public official whose activity
was predicated upon the exercise of discretion. Mandamus
would then issue if the official acted arbitrarily, capriciously
or otherwise in abuse of discretion or beyond the limits of
his discretionary bounds."8 Thus, the unavailability of
mandamus at the time of such actions as Sherman explains
why relators, seeking to challenge an essentially administrative action, nevertheless sought a writ of certiorari.
After the scope of mandamus had been expanded, and
Article 78 was enacted abolishing, at least nominally, the
technical distinctions between the old prerogative writs, the
courts were less accommodating than one might have expected to petitioners seeking to challenge a determination
relating to the selection of land for public use. Combining
the stereotyped analysis of such cases as Sherman (prerogative writs will not lie to review determinations in
42

E.g., In re Long I.R.R. v. Hylan, supra note 23; Santa Clara Lumber
Co. v. Commissioners of Land Office, 209 App. Div. 705, 204 N.Y. Supp.
746 (3d Dep't 1924).
43 See cases cited notes 41 and 42 supra. Cf. People ex rel. R. & J. Co.
v. Wiggins, 199 N.Y. 382, 92 N.E. 789 (1910); People ex rel. Schau v.
McWilliams, 185 N.Y. 92, 77 N.E. 785 (1906); People ex re. North v.
Featherstonhaugh, 172 N.Y. 112, 64 N.E. 802 (1902).
44 People ex rel. Steward v. Railroad Comm'n, 160 N.Y. 202, 54 N.E.
697 (1899); People ex reL. Loughran v. Railroad Comm'rs, 158 N.Y. 421,
53 N.E. 163 (1899). Cf. People ex rel. Scrafford v. Stedman, 57 Hun 280,
10 N.Y. Supp. 787 (4th Dep't 1890).
45 People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioners, 149 N.Y. 26, 43 N.E. 418
(1896).
46 See Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18
N.E.2d 281 (1938).
See also 1
BENJAMIN,

ADMINISTRATIVE

352-53 (1942).
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locating a public thoroughfare) with law that developed
in an area of eminent domain (the determination to take
laud is a political or legislative function impeachable only
for conduct approaching the level of fraud)-" the courts
have declared that since the petition in such a matter sounds
in certiorari, and the action of the public official is legislative, certiorari does not lie as it is not available to review
legislative action."
The syllogism is perfect but the premises are wrong.
First, there is no basis for the contention that the petition
sounds in certiorari. The fact that analogous claims have
been presented to the courts in that form affords no reason
why such a proceeding under an all-writs statute must be
deemed to have been similarly fashioned. If the quasi-judicial
aura is absent, it is incumbent upon the court to determine
whether the claim is one for which prerogative relief nonetheless would previously have been granted; that is, whether
the proceeding is in the nature of mandamus. If the action
of the administrative official is properly characterized as
administrative, then the action is subject to review by
mandamus and may be set aside if arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable. 9 Thus, analysis of the functions of the administrator in the context of the statutory delegation to
him is a basic and indeed a preliminary step in resolving
the problem.
Second, there is no logic in the statement that the
action of the public official is necessarily legislative. Concededly, the legislature can properly delegate its broad
47Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954); Culgar v. Power Authority, '4 Misc. 2d 879,
163 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct), aff'd mer., 4 App. Div. 2d 801, 164 N.Y.S.2d
686 (3d Dep't), aff'd nmern., 3 N.Y.2d 1006, 147 N.E.2d 733, 170 N.Y.S.2d
341 4 (1957).
s Brent v. Hoch, 13 App. Div. 2d 505, 211 N.Y.S.2d 853 (2d Dep't 1961)
(memorandum decision); Schulman v. McMorran, 9 App. Div. 2d 1007, 195
N.Y.S.2d 5 (memorandum decision), resettled, 10 App. Div. 2d 659, 196
N.Y.S.2d 716 (3d Dep't 1959); Brown v. McMorran, 39 Misc. 2d 716, 241
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct 1963), and, with reference to amended petition in
same action, 42 Misc. 2d 211, 247 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (appeal
pending) ; City of Onondaga v. McMorran, 38 Misc. 2d 384, 238 N.Y.S.2d
453 (Sup. Ct 1963).
49See BENJAMJiq, op. cit. 4upra note 46.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 39

legislative powers to select lands for given public uses."
Whether the legal justification for the broad delegation lies
in the impracticality of confining the administrative officer,
or whether the problem is resolved merely by the semantic
conception that the recipient of the delegation is a legislative
body for purposes of the delegation, is essentially academic.
When the legislature delegates its plenary powers the
recipient has as full power to act as if the legislature itself
had acted, and for this reason its activity is characterized
as legislative."
Yet the legislature has, at all times, the power to
delegate something less than its full legislative powers. It
has the power to declare that a road shall be built between
two given points, that a road shall be built in a given
50 See cases cited note 17; supra.
51 When the legislature delegates its powers to select land for a given
public purpose, plenary only in the sense that the recipient of the delegation
may consider as broadly and generally as the legislature the public interest
and the general welfare, the delegation is generally characterized by the
judiciary as legislative. Yet the legislature does not necessarily delegate
powers quite so broad as those it possesses. For example, without specific
authorization, the recipient of the delegation does not possess the power to
delegate. Ontario Knitting Co. v. State, 205 N.Y. 409, 98 N.E. 909 (1912).
Similarly, without statutory authorization, the recipient of the delegation
cannot appropriate land which the legislature has reserved for another use.
Society of N.Y. Hosp. v. Johnson, 5 N.Y2d 102, 154 N.E.2d 550, 180
N.Y.S.2d 287 (1958).
In the latter action the legislature had reserved certain lands for hospital purposes. It subsequently authorized the Department of Public Works
to take any land necessary for highways. As a matter of statutory construction the New York Court of Appeals held that the second authorization
did not supersede the first and the Department of Public Works had no
power to appropriate hospital lands. The determination of what lands were
available for highways lay strictly within the judgment of the legislature.
The contrast between the nature of these delegated powers and the
powers of a town board is a sharp one. The town board can formulate and
carry out its own policies. It can determine, for example, what zoning
restrictions shall be imposed on given property, and can subsequently, by
exercise of its own inherent legislative powers, alter the affected area.
Since the recipient of the delegation in a land appropriation case (if not
otherwise a legislative body) is not the repository of legislative functions,
and since even a broad delegation is a delegation of something less than the
full powers of the legislature, it would seem logical to treat such body as
administrative for all purposes and to sanction the absence of standards on
the basis of impracticability. But the writer recognizes the existing and
firmly entrenched law that acts pursuant to a delegation of full powers in
the selection of land are legislative, and the writer's suggestions for judicial
clarification of the law relate only to the delegation of something less than
the full powers to select.
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direction, or that a road shall be built only if it complies
with given standards determinative to a greater or lesser
extent of location. When the legislature thus steps into the
field and determines how or where a road shall be located,
the delegation is no longer one of plenary powers. Rather,
it is a delegation to an administrative official to carry out
an administrative policy as declared and defined by the
legislature.2
Clearly in Sherman, when the legislature declared that

the highway shall be located to a certain point and "thence
westerly," it legislated with respect to the location of the
route and did not delegate to any other person or body
the plenary power to select a location. The acts of the
administrative official in enforcing this statutorily declared
policy were necessarily administrative."
(The court held
only that the acts were not quasi-judicial.)
52 See Boykin v. State Highway Dep't, 146 S.C. 483, 493-94, 144 S.E.
227, 230 (1927):
"The State Highway Department is an administrative
body, created by the Legislature, with certain fixed duties to perform, and
has no authority to set at naught the explicit instructions of the Legislature.
In Gaston v. State Highway Department, 134 S.C. 402, 132 S.E. 680, this
Court, in considering the 1924 Act, said: 'Where the language of the Act
under consideration is clear and certain as to the routes to be followed, etc.,
the state highway department is bound to conform to the terms of the statute
which, in such cases, neither the highway department nor the courts themselves have any authority to vary."
And again: "The Legislature has the
right, in providing for a system of state highways, to say just where the
roads shall be built, just what kind of roads shall be constructed, how they
shall be built, etc., and when such provisions in the statute are clear and
certain
the highway department is bound to obey the mandate of the law."
53
Moreover, persons for whose benefit such administrative policy is declared-that is, all persons who reside on or own property in the area,
regardless of whether their land will be condemned-probably have no remedy
apart from prerogative writ to challenge the selection.
A taxpayer's suit is unavailable because New York does not authorize
taxpayers' suits against state officials. Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y.
520, 530, 106 N.E. 675, 677-78 (1914).
(There is much sentiment and good
rationale for a rule allowing such stilts.)
See also discussion of proposed
legislative revisions in Mastrangelo v. State Council of Parks, 42 Misc. 2d
650, 657, 248 N.Y.S.2d 19, 26 (Sup. Ci), aff'd mer., - App. Div. 2d -251 N.Y.S.2d 788 (2d Dep't 1964).
Condemnation proceedings provide an available forum only for those
whose land is to be appropriated. There is authority that declaratory and
injunctive relief is similarly limited. See Headley v. City of Rochester, 272
N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936); Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County,
18 N.Y. 155 (1858). The latter forms of action pose problems of sovereign
immunity as wzl. See Niagara Falls Power Co. v. White, 292 N.Y. 472,
55 N.E.2d 742 (1944).
On the other hand, it is believed that all persons for whose benefit a
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Similarly, in Brown v. MeMorran,s ' a proceeding in
which petitioners challenged the location of a highway on
the ground that the determination was made in disregard
of statutory requisites directing selection in accordance
with the economic, cultural and conservation interests of
the affected community, the legislature had delegated something less than its full legislative powers. The recipient
of the delegation was directed by law to administer the
formulated policy, and therefore, the challenged action was,
theoretically, not legislative but administrative in character.
Nonetheless, the court held that the action was legislative
and not subject to Article 78 review."
A case decided less than a year later reached a result
which is in conformity with the above analysis. In Mastrangelo v. State Council of Parks," wherein the statute
required that the land selected for park purposes be open
and natural land, the function of selecting the land was
therefore administrative. The court so held.
In summary, the questions to be determined in the
selection of lands to be taken should be deemed legislative,
policy concerning land selection is declared should have standing to bring
an Article 78 proceeding and that standing can be accorded consistzntly
with precedent. If the duty is clearly a mandatory one, any citizen can
sue. Andresen v. Rice, 277 N.Y. 271, 14 N.E.2d 65 (1938).
A directive
to build a road between two given points should come within this category.
Cf. In re Sherman, 76 Misc. 43, 133 N.Y. Supp. 931 (Sup. Ct. 1912). If
the matters acted upon are essentially of communal or public interest, any
member of the public can sue. Strippoli v. Bickal, 42 Misc. 2d 475, 248
N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 21 App. Div. 2d
365, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (4th Dep't 1964). A directive that a route be selected
in accordance with given interests of the community ought to come within
this latter category. Significantly, it is not the interests of the landowner
qua landowner that are properly considered by the official in determining
location but the interests of the community in having a serviceable and not
destructive highway.
It is further significant that the interests of the
landowner as such extend only to his land, and not to alignment of a route
which is presumably much greater than his land. But cf. Brown v. McMorran, supra note 48, holding that membership in the community is not
a sufficient predicate for standing.
U Supra note 48.
55 Citing Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923), the court
said: "[Tlhe questions to be determined in selection of the land to be
taken are legislative, no matter who may be charged with their decision
...
"
Id. at 719, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
5642 Misc. 2d 650, 249 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mere. -, App. Div.
2d -, 251 N.Y.S.2d 788 (2d Dep't 1964).
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except when they are otherwise fashioned by the legislature. "
When the legislature has formulated a policy with respect
to the location or nature of lands to be taken, then the
official directed to administer that policy necessarily exercises administrative functions, which should be considered
reviewable under Article 78.
RELATIONSHIP
FUNCTIONS:

BETwEEN

LEGISLATE

AND

POLITICAL

THE ADMINISTRATVE POLICY DECISION

The confusion between legislative and political functions arises frequently in the area of land-selection. It is
sometimes said that decisions made in connection with the
selection of land are political and for that reason not
appropriate subjects for review. 8 "Political," as it is used,
is frequently ambiguous and misleading. The writer believes
that the terminology "legislative" and "political" can be
used meaningfully, especially with regard to scope of review.
For this reason the writer turns to an analysis of the
distinction between legislative and political acts and the
practical effects of such distinction.
The official activity of the public officer extends beyond
statutorily guided duties. It encompasses an area of administrative detail and matters of policy. The authority to
act is plenary and not confining. It carries with it that
flexibility which is essential to the efficient functioning of
the public officer. The act in itself, not being directed,
forbidden or otherwise circumscribed by legislation, might
be characterized as legislative; but for purposes related to
the scope of review it is best described as political.
L5 Cf. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Bohlinger, 308 N.Y. 174, 124 N.E.2d
110 (1954). The court of appeals there held that whenever the legislature

prescribes standards it is the "power and duty of the courts" to see that
those standards are followed; and this result obtains even though the
statute declares that the acts of the administrative official are not subject
to judicial review.
58Burda v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 204 Misc. 232, 120
N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 671, 127 N.Y.S.2d 348
(2d Dep't 1954) ; It; re Seneca Ave., 98 Misc. 712, 715, 163 N.Y. Supp. 503,

505 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
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The determination to take a fee rather than an easement
in connection with appropriating land for public use is
exactly this kind of decision. The New York Court of
Appeals so analyzed the problem in the often-cited Ely
Avenue case. Precisely in answer to this challenge--that
an easement was sufficient and a fee should not have been
appropriated, the court of appeals said:
It is the established law by numerous decisions by this court
that in the exercise of the power of eminent domain the opinion
of the legislature or the tribunal upon which is conferred power
to determine the questions of necessity or expediency in the acquirement of private property for public use is political, not judicial,
in its nature. 50
59
Matter of City of New York (Ely Ave.), 217 N.Y. 45, 57, 111 N.E.
266, 270 (1916). The Ely Avenue case is frequently cited for the proposition that necessity of appropriation is a legislative question and is, therefore, not subject to review. E.g., Culgar v. Power Authority, supra note
47, at 897, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 921; In re Joe's Downtown, Inc., 80 N.Y.S.2d
41 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Kip v. New York Cent. R.R., 140 Misc. 62, 66, 250
N.Y. Supp. 5, 9 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd memr., 236 App. Div. 654, 257 N.Y.
Supp. 919 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 260 N.Y. 692, 184 N.E. 148 (1932);
Board of Hudson River Regulating Dist. v. Fonda, J. & G. R.R., 127
Misc. 866, 880, 217 N.Y. Supp. 781, 796 (Sup. Ct. 1926), aff'd, 223 App.
Div. 358, 228 N.Y. Supp. 686 (3d Dep't), modified, 249 N.Y. 455, 164 N.E.
541 (1928). Cf. Burda v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, supra note 58
(determination declared political and not reviewable); In re Seneca Ave.,
supra note 58 (determination declared political and not reviewable).
The characterization (legislative) is not helpful, and the conclusion (nonreviewable) is not accurate. The problem can be better understood by
comparison of the question of necessity with that of public use.
The courts draw a distinction between the necessity of the taking and
the public nature of the appropriation. The former, as indicated, is labeled
a legislative question. The latter is characterized as a judicial one. See
Saso v. State, 20 Misc. 2d 826, 194 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1959) and
cases cited therein. See also Buell v. Genesee State Park Comm'n, 25 Misc.
2d 841, 206 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
"Judicial," as used in these cases, refers not to the nature and form
of a proceeding labeled, in administrative law, quasi-judicial. Rather, it
indicates a justiciable issue subject to the ordinary scope of review. On the
other hand, "legislative" does not necessarily connote the absence of a
justiciable issue. Rather, as used by the courts in these cases, it indicates
a scope of review limited to such questions as bad faith and fraud. See
Saso v. State, sapra; Culgar v. Power Authority, supra note 47.
The determination that an appropriation is made for a public purpose is
as much a legislative determination as any other determination made by a
body vested with the broad power to act in the general interests of the
public. The fact that the determination is subject to be set aside in a plenary
action as arbitrary or unreasonable, as is legislation, provides all the more
reason why the public purpose question should be labeled legislative.
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The decision, being political, is amenable only to limited
review and is not amenable to the prerogative writs. The
only question which can be raised is whether the determination was corruptly or baselessly made."
The limitation on the scope of review accords with the

practicalities demanded by governmental operation. In the
interests of efficient government, decisions of policy are
best left to the nearly absolute judgment of the public officer.
What decisions are political? The Ely Avenue case
affords some basis for analysis. Although the case involves
only legislative functions, the same decision-to take an
easement or a fee-might be made by the administrative
official acting within a sphere as confined as that in Sherman
(to locate a route from X point westerly). In other words,
the public officer who exercises essentially administrative
functions, which functions are properly the subject of
Article 78 review, also exercises incidental powers related
to administrative detail and circumscribed by nothing more
The question of necessity, on the other hand, is judicially treated as
something less than a legislative question. It is not favored with that scope
of review accorded to legislation.
Thus, the writer conceives the question of public use to be a legislative
one, the question of necessity, political, and both-although differing as to
scope of review-justiciable.
6oKaskel v. Impellitteri, supra note 47. See Culgar v. Power Authority,
supra note 47. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961), wherein the Supreme
Court, addressing itself to the problem of legislative reapportionment, characterized the totally non-justiciable political issue:
"Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
"Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,
there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political
question's presence." Id. at 267.
Perhaps because none of the above formulations is completely inextricable
from the usual activities of an administrative officer, such activities are not,
and should not be, totally beyond judicial oversight. Accordingly, the
"political question" discussed in this article is semantically different from
the "political question" of Baker v. Carr. It signifies a narrow scope of
review, as opposed to no review at all.
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than the fiduciary duty to act in the general interests of
the people. The decisions so made are decisions of policy 1
The determination by a board of supervisors to purchase
a certain water supply system is such a decision. 2 So, too,
is the determination of the health commissioner not to include funds for mosquito control in the budget of the Department of Health." Location, dedication or discontinuance
of a highway is also such a decision when the legislature
was delegated its plenary powers, but not when it has, by
structuring the area itself, stripped the determination of this
character. 5
A general rule can be abstracted. The acts of public
officers which, by statute, must be performed in accordance
with specified standards are always administrative 6 6 and
therefore always subject to review under Article 78.7 The
61 Whether such decisions are political or legislative
is academic with
respect to Article 78 review, for in either case such review is not available.
The distinction is apposite in ascertaining scope of review in a plenary action.
62 Cf. Nigocki v. Dennison, 219 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
The controversy presented a legal question as to whether the seller had title to the
water system it purported to sell. The expediency of the purchase, including
the question and possible risk of title, was properly left to the judgment of
the board of supervisors.
63 Cf. Modugno v. Baumgartner,
11 Misc. 2d 1022, 173 N.Y.S.2d 729
(Sup. Ct. 1958). Quoting from the New York Court of Appeals, the court
declared: "'The courts do not sit in judgment upon questions of legislative
policy or administrative discretion. The taxpayer must point to illegality or
fraud.' (Canmpbell v. City of New York, 244 N.Y. 317, 328, 50 A.L.R. 1480.)
Again, in Picone v. City of New York, 176 Misc. 967, 970, the court said:
'The courts have no right to sit in judgment upon questions of administrative
discretion, or interfere with the conduct of municipal officials in the absence
of illegality, fraud, collusion, corruption or bad faith.'"Id. at 1023, 173
N.Y.S.2d at 731.
64 Cf. Smith v. Gagliardi, 144 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
65 Whether the public necessity of the appropriation
of certain lands
ought to have the effect of a political decision presents a debatable question
but is beyond the point of advocacy in the New York courts. There is
nonetheless appeal to the argument that the determination of necessity should
at least be subject to the same scrutiny as a true legislative act. Indeed, public
necessity and public use have overlapping implications, and the latter is accorded full review. See note 59 supra.
Compare, at the other extreme, the law of California, which declares
that necessity is never a justiciable issue even though the determination is
infected with fraud or bad faith. See People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works
v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 307, 340 P.2d 598, 603 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
66 If not quasi-judicial.
67 Unless review is precluded by extraneous factors not discussed herein.
For example, the underlying statute might provide that the public officer's
exercise of discretion is absolute and unreviewable. See Sheridan v. McElligott, 278 N.Y. 59, 15 N.E.2d 398 (1938).
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acts may be impeached on the ground that they are not
predicated upon or are otherwise inconsistent with those
standards, or are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The
incidental acts of administrative officials, performed pursuant to the plenary power to execute administrative detail
in the best interests of the people, are political." The
powers of political decision-making are practically and properly reposed in the public officer, whose discretion in matters
of policy is unimpeachable except for corruption or fraud,
and never impeachable under Article 78.69
CONCLUSION

Legislative acts of legislative bodies are not subject
to review by proceedings in the nature of mandamus,
certiorari or prohibition. When local legislative bodies exercise administrative functions, pursuant to what is, in
effect, a delegation to themselves, their acts are within the
purview of Article 78 scrutiny. This result obtains and the
action is deemed administrative, even though the powers
delegated by the public body to itself are commensurate in
scope with the plenary legislative powers underlying the
delegation. The operative fact in such a case is that the
manner of the action is not legislative (that is, not effected
by enactment of, amendment of, or failure to enact or
amend a law or ordinance).
The delegation of plenary legislative powers other than
to a legislative body is, as a general rule, unconstitutional.
8 Because the administrative official assigned to carry out a statutorily
defined policy has no legislative powers as such, it must be assumed that his
non-administrative acts are political. The distinction between the legislative

and political functions of the non-legislative body acting legislatively (e.g.,
the Department of Public Works in cases in which it has plenary powers
to select and appropriate land) is more difficult to draw. Because neither
the legislative nor the political function comes within the scope of Article 78,
the problem is not herein relevant. However, where case law has established
that the basic function (e.g., selection of land) is political, it would seem that
the lesser functions must necessarily be deemed political, for surely logic
would not favor them with greater judicial scrutiny.
69For a well considered analysis of acts of public officers which are
political and hence unreviewable at the instance of a citizen or taxpayer,
see Jaffe, Standing to Secure Tudicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 1265, 1292-1307 (1961).
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Accordingly, the question of review of legislative acts of
administrative bodies does not ordinarily arise. A notable
exception to the rule proscribing delegation without standards and without a structured administrative policy lies in
the area relating to the acquisition of land for public purposes. The legislature can delegate its plenary powers to
determine where, when and how to lay a highway or build
a school. When the legislature does delegate such broad
powers and the public officer who is the recipient of the
delegated powers acts pursuant to the delegation, he exercises a function legislative in character but administrative
in manner. The case law declares that his action is legislative and not subject to Article 78 review.
Moreover, the case law, apart from Article 78, so
severely limits review of questions concerning selection of
land that no such selection will be set aside unless it is
found to be fraudulent, in excess of statutory powers, or
not for a public purpose. Thus, if a state official arbitrarily
decides to appropriate developed land in a residential community for a public structure of nuisance-type proportions,
notwithstanding the fact that the state owns undeveloped
land in a nonresidential area of an even more suitable
nature, neither the property owner nor the taxpayer has
any judicial remedy.
This unwarranted result should be corrected by statute.
Legislation should declare that all acts by an administrative
body regarding the selection of land are administrative
for purposes of Article 78 review. If reluctance to enact
such legislation springs from the conception that the selection of land is necessarily arbitrary, 0 then it should be
recognized that although many results may be warranted,
other results may be unwarranted. The law should not,
for example, permit the state to appropriate land for a state
institution in the middle of a bird sanctuary, when land
equally well suited to the same purposes and causing little
or no personal damage or dislocation is available outside
70People v. Adirondack Ry., 160 N.Y. 225, 238, 54 N.E. 689, 693 (1899),
aff'd, 176 U.S. 335 (1900).
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the sanctuary. The question is not one of better judgment;
it is not a question of degree. It is not proposed that a
court should balance competing interests. But, it is proposed
that a court should test the determinations of the public
officer by the traditional standards of arbitrariness, unreasonableness and capriciousness.
If, on the other hand, reluctance to enact the suggested
legislation lies in the supposition that a multitude of
lawsuits might be inspired, then it should be recognized that
the nonexistence of standards is in itself a deterrent to
prospective petitioners as they will find much difficulty in
framing a good cause of action in the absence of a strong
supporting factual basis.
Since it is clear in cases involving land appropriation
that the legislature can delegate its plenary powers, the
relevant question with respect to Article 78 reviewability
is whether the legislature did delegate its plenary powers.
When the legislature structures the area within which the
public officer must act in order to carry out the statutorily
declared policy, the officer's actions are, by definition, administrative both in character and in manner and should
be the appropriate subjects of Article 78 review. In order
to take advantage of this rule (which, although not firmly
entrenched in the law, is urged as the only proper result),
the draftsman of the Article 78 petition should take much
care to frame his allegations in terms of how the public
officer violated statutory standards if any and otherwise
exceeded statutorily imposed limitations. He should at the
same time preserve the argument that the acts challenged
were otherwise arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, in
anticipation of a rule of law which may yet declare arbitrary
legislative acts of an administrative officer vulnerable to
judicial attack.

